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Both the formal introduction of Big Four into China and the privatization of Chinese 
state-owned enterprises started in the 1990s, but few scholars have studied the relationship 
between them. Theoretically, Big Four can provide more accurate information about the 
company’s value to the market through higher quality auditing services, which could reduce 
information asymmetry during the privatization process. On the other hand, Big Four could 
convey positive signals to the market by its own good reputation. Generally, SOEs that employ 
Big Four have better financial performance, which can boost the confidence of private investors. 
The paper will take A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2018 in China as the sample, select 
the enterprise ownership and state-owned shares proportion as the proxy variables to investigate 
whether Big Four has impacts on the privatization of Chinese SOEs. The principal hypothesis 
is that Big Four can significantly promote the privatization process of SOEs in China after 
controlling regional and time fixed effects. In addition, the longer the audit period of Big Four, 
the higher the probability of privatization and the lower the proportion of state-owned shares. 











China has reopened its door to foreign trade and reformed its state-owned enterprises 
since 1978. The reform primarily focused on ownership privatization, according to Jefferson 
(2006), it consisted of four stages in total: firstly, large numbers of new enterprises that are 
characterized by private or mixed ownership will emerge in the market; secondly, reform 
managerial control rights within current public ownership system, for example, establish 
contract responsibility framework to strengthen managerial incentives; thirdly, asset structures 
changes will occur with the injection of non-state capital into the state-owned sectors; finally, 
the outright conversion of enterprises from state or collective ownership to some other formal 
ownership classification will be achieved. However, accounting for about 35% of GDP, state 
ownership remains significant in the current Chinese economy. Such gradual and selective 
privatization process has already attracted much attention in the literature. Bai, Lu & Tao (2008) 
argued that China has maintained state ownership as a second-best way to absorb surplus labor 
and stabilize society. Another argument is that SOEs in China are supervised by the State Assets 
Agency which is in charge of managing state-owned enterprises for all people in the society, 
therefore, they are not entirely profit-driven and could be circumvented, in this case, 
privatization cannot take place unless the private interests of the management are also taken 
into consideration properly. Although the speed of privatization has distinguished China from 
other centrally planned economies and the domestic reform of Chinese SOEs is usually 
commensurate with mixed ownership reform in 1980s and 1990s, its essence was still consistent 
with western privatization at the initial stage, which is expected to be completed by ownership 
transfer and disinvestment. According to Wu & Lansdowne (2015), the details of the 
privatization are “black boxed” in China since the government didn’t have any systematic 
records, neither has the central administration nor any local authority ever released a progress 
report about it to the public. Generally, it is argued that Chinese SOEs have experienced two 
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large-scale privatization processes since 1990s. 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) were 
established in December 1990 and April 1991 respectively. Many poorly performed companies 
were sold off through auctions and corporate transformation because politicians that controlled 
them usually have high incentives for economically inefficient objectives. Meanwhile, some 
large- and medium-sized SOEs were given favorable access to transform into publicly listed 
firms on the stock market and refinance capital through initial public offerings (IPO), which 
could be regarded as the start of the first large-scale privatization process of Chinese SOEs 
named Share Issue Privatization (Sun & Tong, 2003). During the reform, there were two types 
of shares, namely tradable shares and non-tradable shares, which formed a unique split-share-
structure in the imperfect Chinese stock markets. On the one hand, the government obtained 
cash flow by refinancing through the privatization of SOEs, on the other hand, as Yang, Hou & 
Qian (2015) mentioned, only tradable shares could be publicly issued to ordinary institutions or 
individuals, but these shares accounted for less than one-third of the stock market. The rest of 
shares that accounted for more than two-thirds were non-tradable, which indicated that absolute 
state control and public ownership were actually still maintained at that time of period. In 
addition, since non-tradable share prices were determined based on the booking value of the 
company's assets, this part of shareholders became insensitive to all the market fluctuations, 
resulting in tenuous corporate governance structures and serious principal-agent problems 
which brought lots of difficulties to the future privatization process. Therefore, Share Issue 
Privatization can only be called partial privatization in the western terminology.  
The existence of non-tradable shares has been regarded as the biggest impediment of 
Chinese equity market. After going through several attempts for further privatization, state-
owned enterprise's second truly viable private process began in 2005 with the split share 
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structure reform. The "Administrative Measures for the Reform of the Split Share Structure of 
Listed Companies" promulgated by Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission required listed 
companies to convert all the listed non-tradable shares into legally tradable shares, and forbade 
equity refinance before the completion of the changes, which pushed the non-tradable 
shareholders to figure out a compensation package that was acceptable to the tradable 
shareholders (Lee, 2008). At the same time, the government targeted foreign direct investment 
as the primary approach to cushion the potential shock in the stock market. The problem of split 
share structure was solved gradually, and the reform of state-owned enterprises has entered the 
fast track. To be more specific, during the Share Split Reform, the withdrawal of state-owned 
capital gave private investors much more new opportunities to enter into the field originally 
occupied by the government. A large amount of non-tradable shares such as legal person shares 
which were originally held by the central or local government started to be absorbed by non-
state-owned capital. Since then, the privatization of a great number of people entering and 
government leaving has provided a sample possibility for this empirical study. 
Arthur Andersen, Arthur Young, Coopers & Lybrand, Haskins & Sells, Ernst & Ernst, 
Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co., Price Waterhouse, and Touche Ross were collectively known as 
the Big Eight for much of the twentieth century (Stevens, 1981). According to Gillis (2011), 
each of the Big Four firms now traces its origins to the U.K. and the U.S. in the nineteenth 
century, specifically, Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co. merged with Netherlands based Klynveld 
Main Goerdeler to create KPMG in 1987. Afterwards, in 1989, Ernst & Whinney merged with 
Arthur Young to form Ernst & Young, in the same year, Deloitte, Haskins and Sells merged 
with Touche Ross to become Deloitte & Touche. In 1993, Deloitte & Touche changed its name 
to Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu to recognize the importance of its Japanese firm. In 1998, Coopers 
& Lybrand merged with Price Waterhouse to create PricewaterhouseCoopers. In 2002, Arthur 
Andersen failed in the wake of a criminal conviction for its complicity in the Enron scandal and 
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the Big Five became the Big Four (Toffler, 2003). In this paper, the term Big Four represented 
these four firms. 
The introduction of the Big Four in China and the privatization of China's SOEs began 
almost simultaneously. After Deng Xiaoping encouraged to accelerate reforms during his well-
known Southern Tour in 1992, foreign investment flooded into China, helping it become the 
second largest destination for foreign direct investment only behind the United States (Gillis, 
2011). As mentioned before, China reopened its stock exchanges and privatized the economy 
rapidly, therefore, many Chinese companies started to publicly list in international stock 
exchanges in order to improve their competitiveness in the global markets. Such acceleration 
of reform created huge opportunities for the Big Four to capture the expanding accounting 
markets since foreign investors preferred to choose their own accounting firms and investment 
bankers also advised Chinese companies that were seeking for international stock listings to 
hire the Big Four. According to Gillis (2011), in 1992, Big Four won the official right to offer 
audit services in China by forming joint ventures with State institutions and obtained a dominant 
position in the market quickly, in turn, these four international firms promoted the standardized 
development and reform of Chinese SOEs. Therefore, the introduction of Big Four and the 
privatization of SOEs were mutually reinforcing, which have encouraged the construction and 
development of market economy in China. 
The state-owned enterprises in this article refer to those are listed on the A-shares market 
and ultimately controlled by the central or local government, or all other levels of state-owned 
asset management committees and platforms. Generally, state investment percentage in these 
firms is more than 50%. According to Lin & Lu (2019), they are generally considered as 
inefficient in productivity, but Chinese economy that relies on them heavily has been proven to 
be successful over the last few years, indicating their importance in the future economic success. 
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Given that privatization has become one of the most important directions in the reform of 
Chinese state-owned enterprises, studying the factors that affect the implement of it could help 
promote deeper reform and healthier development of SOEs. However, in fact, researches about 
factors that affects privatization as well as the corresponding influence mechanism are relatively 
lacked. Although the introduction of Big Four and the privatization of SOEs have attracted lots 
of interests from scholars in a separate manner, few literatures have tried to investigate the 
relationship between them. Therefore, this paper will study whether the Big Four can promote 
the privatization process of Chinese SOEs based on empirical evidence. Specifically, the 
privatization process is reflected in the change of the company's controlling shareholder from a 
state-owned one to a non-state-owned one, or a decline in the state-owned shares percentage. 
In addition, the paper will explore the micro-mechanisms of such potential effects and provide 




There are few literatures that directly study the impact of auditing on privatization, but 
some studies have shown that institutional factors such as the extent of state ownership can 
significantly affect listed companies’ auditor choice decisions. For example, Wang & Wong 
(2008) argued that Chinese SOEs are more likely to hire small auditors compared with non-
state-owned firms within the same region, which could be explained by SOE’s collusion 
incentives and small auditors’ superior local knowledge. To be more specific, according to Chen 
et al. (2000), an acquiescent auditor would allow its client to manipulate profits by not issuing 
a modified opinion that could cause a decrease in share prices. Although all listed companies 
have incentives to collude with auditors, government owners face the least collusion costs due 
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to their political power. Bushman, Piotroski & Smith (2004) investigated corporate 
transparency, which is defined as the availability of firm‐specific information to those outside 
public listed firms, their results indicated that financial and governance transparency display a 
significant and negative association with the level of state-owned shareholding. Liu & Saidi 
(2014) examined the effect of state ownership on firms’ earning quality, showing that Chinese 
SOEs exhibit a lower earnings quality than non-state-owned firms. Particularly, SOEs have less 
frequent timely recognition of losses, and significantly higher discretionary current accruals. 
Therefore, the conclusion that Chinese government had incentives and also actually created 
some regulatory backing for self-serving purposes that negatively impact listed companies’ 
financial information disclosure through its controlling power of listed SOEs and political 
influence on accounting firms can be reached. 
According to Guedhami & Pittman (2009), foreign owners who require more credible 
financial information to reduce information asymmetry may prefer to hire Big Four auditors 
since these investors may perceive that an auditor from Big Four is qualified to ensure that 
managers who are responsible have less discretion to manipulate the accounting numbers. 
Indeed, the conversion from state to private ownership generally brings serious agency conflicts 
between minority investors and corporate insiders, who frequently remain politically connected 
afterward (Boubakri et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2007). In other words, foreign investors choose Big 
Four to monitor the newly privatized companies better and prevent expropriation by controlling 
insiders and their political backers. Guedhami (2009) also checked how the dynamics of auditor 
choice evolve during the transition from state to private ownership, the results showed that the 
higher the state-owned shareholdings in a company, or the lower the foreign-owned shares, the 
higher probability that the company will choose a low-level external auditor, and the probability 
of employing Big Four as the auditor after privatization is 64% higher than before. However, 
the paper also points out potential endogeneity problems. There is no explanation about the 
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causal relationship between audit choices and privatization.  
Many empirical papers have also studied the relationship between state ownership and 
firm performance, but the results are mixed. Generally, state-owned firms are found to be less 
efficient and less profitable than private ones given that politicians have both the motives and 
the power to impose their multiple social objectives on affiliated companies which resulted in 
poorer performance (Xu & Wang 1999; Hanwen et al. 2011; Yu 2013). On the other hand, Sun 
et al. (2002) examined a sample of public listed firms in China from 1994 to 1997 and found 
that state ownership has an inverted U-shaped or concave relationship with stock market 
performance, therefore, government support through state ownership is valuable and necessary 
to vitalize performance. However, Ng et al. (2009) and Hess et al. (2010) examined Chinese 
listed companies from 1996 to 2003 and 2000 to 2004 respectively, both of them argued a 
convex relationship between state ownership and firm performance. 
In conclusion, the existing researches about the impacts of Big Four audits mainly focus 
on audit quality, whether there are other aspects except it, for example, reputation mechanism 
still requires further investigations. 
 
Hypothesis 
Chinese SOEs do not just set maximizing shareholders’ value as the single corporate 
governance objective. They may take actions that can harm the value of the company and the 
interests of small and medium shareholders due to political considerations. As a result, SOEs 
will tend to choose low-level audit services to reduce effective and truthful disclosures of their 
financial information which could have negative impacts on the company. However, during the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, non-state-owned capital will pay more attention to the 
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real financial status and profitability of the target, then will require higher quality financial 
statements. That is, non-state shareholders generally have greater demands for high-quality 
auditing service. Since past literatures have shown that Big Four is usually more qualified to 
strengthen the external supervision of the company, the paper assumes that non-state investors 
are more inclined to invest in state-owned companies that hire Big Four as their auditors, which 
means that Big Four can positively impact the privatization process of Chinese SOEs. The two 
principal assumptions are as following: 
Hypothesis 1: Compared with Non-Big-Four auditors, Big Four can significantly promote the 
conversion of Chinese state-owned enterprises from state-owned to non-state-owned. 
Hypothesis 2: Compared with Non-Big-Four auditors, Big Four can significantly reduce the 
state-owned share proportion in Chinese SOEs. 
It is also assumed that the length of period that audited by Big Four can affect audit 
quality. Geiger & Raghunandan (2002) found that there is a positive relationship between 
auditor tenure and the likelihood of the auditor issuing a going concern opinion, also audit 
failures are more likely to occur during the first years of auditor tenure. On the other hand, an 
accounting firm that has performed a long-term audit in a specific industry could accumulate 
deeper professional knowledge and experience, which can avoid recurring mistakes made 
before, reduce human error, and improve auditing quality. It is assumed that if Big Four has 
provided audit services to certain public listed companies for a long time, they will definitely 
understand the company's industry characteristics, business models, and financial conditions 
better, which could help to improve the quality of audit services and then promote the 
privatization process of SOEs. 
Hypothesis 3: The probability that a Chinese state-owned enterprise will change from state-
owned to non-state-owned increases with the increase of Big Four auditing tenure. 
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Hypothesis 4: The state-owned share proportion in Chinese SOEs decreases with the increase 
of Big Four auditing tenure. 
 
Data and Variables 
The research sample is derived from CSMAR database and WIND database which 
disclose various financial statements, financial indicators, and equity structure of listed 
companies every year in detail. This paper summed the top ten largest shareholders of state-
owned shares and legal person shares to obtain the proxy variable for state-owned shares 
proportion as what most of the previous researches did. Since companies with dual listings in 
the Mainland and Hong Kong are required to hire accounting firms from both Mainland and 
Hong Kong, the level of supervision they face is expected to be much higher than that of A-
share listed companies. Therefore, A + H listed companies are excluded from the dataset. In 
addition, financial companies are not included because they are not comparable with the 
majority of other industries. After dealing with the samples from financial industry, missing 
data, as well as A + H listed companies, the remaining panel dataset includes a total of 23,517 
firm-level observations were obtained over the period 2005 to 2018. 
The extent of privatization is regarded as the endogenous variable. It is described by two 
proxy variables: one is control attribute, which takes value 1 if the enterprise is state-owned and 
takes value 0 if it is non-state-owned; another is State Ownership, which is evaluated by the 
proportion of state-owned shares. One of the exogenous variables is the auditing firm, which 
takes value 1 if the company employs one of the Big Four (PwC, DTT, EY or KPMG) and takes 
value 0 otherwise. The audit tenure of Big Four is treated as the second explanatory variable. It 
is also important to control other factors that can potentially affect the privatization process of 
Chinese SOEs. In this paper, the control variables are divided into micro level and macro level. 
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For example, in the firm level, return on assets (ROA) is an indicator of how profitable a 
company is relative to its total assets, which indicates how efficient the management is at using 
total assets to generate profits. Debt-to-capitalization ratio measures the amount of debt in a 
company’s capital structure and indicates the financial leverage. Market value ratio is used to 
evaluate the current share price of a publicly-held company's stock, which could help current 
and potential investors to determine whether a company's share prices are overpriced or 
underpriced. In addition, year and region dummy variables are included to absorb the variations 
among different provinces over time. 










define state-owned holding as 1; non-state-owned 
holding as 0 
State 
Ownership  
calculate state-owned share proportion  
Exogenous 
Variables 
Audit Firm BIG FOUR define Big Four as 1, otherwise 0 
Audit Tenure TENURE years audited by Big Four 
Control 
Variables 
Size SIZE natural logarithm of market value 
ROA ROA ratio of net profit to total assets 
Leverage Ratio LEV 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
Revenue Growth GROWTH growth ratio of revenues 
Inventory Ratio INV ratio of inventory to total assets 
Market Value Ratio MB ratio of market value to book value 
Province PROV province code 
FDI FDI natural logarithm of total foreign direct investment 





According to Bell, Fairbrother & Jones (2019), random effects indicated zero 
correlation between the observed exogenous variables and the unobserved effects. Conversely, 
fixed effects allowed for arbitrary correlation between them. In this case, (Durbin-Wu-) 
Hausman test is conducted in order to choose between fixed and random effects estimation. The 
results indicated that the p-value is small (less than 0.01), therefore, the null hypothesis that 
difference in coefficients is not systematic should be rejected. Random effects model is not 
consistent, fixed effects estimation is preferred. 
Models 1 and 2 are designed to test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3, the endogenous 
variable is the ownership attribute of listed companies which is a binary variable with a value 
of 1 or 0. In these two models, logit regression will be applied to avoid heteroscedasticity, which 
can estimate the coefficients of explanatory variables and explain the statistical probability of 
privatization effectively. The model controls other financial factors that could affect the 
privatization process, as well as the fixed effects of region and time. 
Model 1: SOE = α + β1 BIG FOUR + ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + ∑ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + error 
Model 2: SOE = α + β1 TENURE + ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + ∑ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + error 
Models 3 and 4 correspond to Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 4. The average state-owned 
share percentage is a continuous variable with a value between 0 and 1, so the ordinary least 
square regression is applied. The model also controls other financial factors that may impact 
the probability of privatization, as well as the regional and time fixed effect. 
Model 3: State Ownership = α + β1 BIG FOUR + ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠+ ∑ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠+ error 





As shown in the following table, 51% of the listed companies are state-owned. The 
average state-owned shares ratio is approximately 22.68%. The highest ratio of state-owned 
shares in A-share listed companies is 97.16%. Among the whole sample, companies that hired 
one of the Big Four accounting firms accounted for only 13.5%, and the average period audited 
by Big Four was about one year and seven months. The province codes are derived from 
Touchstone Exposure Data Validation Reference which range from 11 to 65, more details could 
be found in the appendix.  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Means SD Min. Max. 
SOE 0.51 0.50 0 1 
STATE 22.68 23.85 0 97.16 
BIG4 0.14 0.34 0 1 
TENURE 1.68 3.50 0 16 
SIZE 21.84 1.28 14.94 28.51 
LEV 0.46 0.21 -0.20 1.00 
ROA 0.04 0.17 -1.00 20.76 
GROWTH 0.81 40.52 -0.97 47.20 
INV 0.16 0.15 0 0.94 
MB 2.25 9.97 0.05 983.30 




Furthermore, as the results shown in Table 3, 20,343 observations in the sample data 
were not audited by the Big Four. Except that there is no significant difference in ROA and 
GROWTH, the remaining indicators are significantly different from each other in the two 
groups. 66.5% of the companies audited by the Big Four are state-owned, by contrast, 49% of 
the companies audited by non- "Big Four" are state-owned. Likewise, among the public listed 
companies audited by Big Four, the state-owned share ratio (29.33%) is higher, the size, ROA 
and leverage ratio of companies audited by Big Four are also significantly higher than those 
listed audited by non- “Big Four”. But the revenue growth rate of Big Four audited firms are 
lower. 
Table 3: Mean Difference 
Variables Non- Big Four Means Big Four Means Mean Diff. 
SOE 20343 0.487 3174 0.665 -0.178*** 
STATE 20343 21.64 3174 29.33 -7.693*** 
SIZE 20343 21.70 3174 22.73 -1.028*** 
LEV 20343 0.456 3174 0.489 -0.034*** 
ROA 20343 0.042 3174 0.045 -0.003 
GROWTH 20343 0.822 3174 0.739 0.083 
INV 20343 0.165 3174 0.152 0.013*** 
MB 20343 2.344 3174 1.641 0.703*** 
PROV-CODE 20343 45.85 3174 45.41 0.442* 
 
Table 4 is the correlation matrix. From the results, the binary variable Big Four is 
positively correlated with both SOE and state ownership. Therefore, the SOEs included in the 
sample that are in the process of privatization tend to be more likely to hire one of the Big Four 
accounting firms. In addition, the probability of employing Big Four increases with the state-
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owned shares proportion.  Likewise, the audit period of Big Four is also positively correlated 
with variable SOE and state ownership, indicating that when the central or local government 
holds more shares in the state-owned enterprises, Big Four tend to be hired for a longer period 
of time in order to complete their privatization process. With regards to the control variables, 
firm size, leverage ratio and inventory ratio are significantly and positively correlated with the 
control attribute of the enterprise and the state-owned share percentage. Specifically, larger 
Chinese SOEs are more inclined to hire Big Four and generally would keep the Big Four 
auditors for a longer period of time compared to smaller firms. Return on assets and market-to-
book ratio are found to be negatively correlated with SOE, indicating that state-owned 
enterprises have worse performance in using their total assets to generate earnings and their 
share prices are potentially overestimated on the stock market. Growth and inventory rate are 




Firstly, set the control attribute as the explained variable. Big Four and tenure are 
regarded as the independent variables respectively. Under the whole sample, whether the public 
listed company is audited by one of the Big Four auditing firms has a significant and positive 
impact on the probability of privatization. After controlling firm size, financial performance 
indicators and other fixed effects, the regression coefficient of the binary variable Big Four is 
about -0.167, and it is significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that the probability of privatization 
for listed SOEs that are audited by Big Four could significantly increase by 16.7%.  
When audit tenure is included as the independent variable, the estimated coefficient of 
it is -0.0224 and is significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that when SOEs are audited by Big 
Four for one more year, the probability of privatization could increase by 2.24%. Therefore, 
Big Four promoted the privatization process of listed state-owned companies. These results 
confirmed Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3 respectively. With regards to the coefficients of 
control variables, the results showed that it tends to be more difficult for larger SOEs to be 
privatized, in addition, the higher the leverage ratio, return on assets, growth and market value 
ratio, the higher the probability of privatization. 








































N 23517 23517 
R-square 0.1629 0.1641 
 
After dividing the whole sample into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned 
enterprises, the regression results in Table 6 showed that whether to hire one of the Big Four 
accounting firms has different effects on the variable state ownership among state-owned and 
non-state-owned enterprises. For Chinese state-owned enterprises, the audit of Big Four can 
significantly reduce the proportion of state-owned shares since the coefficient of independent 
variable BIG4 is –1.220, and it is significant at the 0.05 level. Therefore, SOEs that were audited 
by Big Four tend to be more attractive to private institutions or individuals and more likely to 
be privatized successfully, which confirms Hypothesis 2. In addition, the coefficient of Big 
Four tenure is -0.248 and it is significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that the longer SOEs are 
audited by Big Four, the lower proportion of state-owned shares, which confirms Hypothesis 4. 
The state-owned shares percentage increase with the firm size since the coefficient of size is 
positive and significant. Return of assets, inventory ratio and market value ratio also have a 
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positive impact on the dependent variable. 
For non-state-owned enterprises, the coefficient of BIG4 is 0.505, and the coefficient of 
the Big Four tenure is 0.0195, but both of them are not statistically significant at the 0.1 level, 
therefore, hiring one the Big Four accounting firms as auditors cannot increase the proportion 
of state-owned shares in non-state-owned enterprises, which is reasonable since the demand of 
auditing for state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises are heterogeneous. The coefficients 
of firm size and return on assets are positive and significant, indicating that the central or local 
authorization tend to invest more on larger private enterprises with better financial performance. 
Table 6: Regression – Dependent Variable: state ownership 




































































N 12027 12027 11490 11490 
R-square 0.2604 0.2613 0.0945 0.00973 
 
According to Allison (2012), multicollinearity is a potential problem when estimating 
linear or generalized linear models, including logistic regression. It occurs when independent 
variables are highly correlated with each other, causing unreliable and unstable estimations of 
regression coefficients. So, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is tested in table 7.  It estimated 
how much the variance of a coefficient is inflated due to linear dependence with other predictors. 
From the results, VIFs of return on assets and market ratio are 3.357 and 4.604 respectively, 
which are higher than 2.5, but these two collinear variables are only treated as control variables, 
and adjusted R square in this model when Big Four is the explained variable is 0.168, therefore, 
multicollinearity problem could be safely ignored. 





Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)  -24.269 .000   
LEV -.054 -5.101 .000 .690 1.449 
ROA .114 6.995 .000 .298 3.357 
INV -.071 -5.587 .000 .489 2.047 
Growth -.007 -.739 .460 .967 1.034 
Size .288 24.423 .000 .567 1.764 




Since 1992, the emergence of Sino-foreign cooperative accounting firms has made great 
contributions to the international convergence of audit standards. Many studies have shown that 
Big Four is superior in terms of audit quality than domestic accounting firms in China. After 20 
years of rapid development, revenues of Big Four have accounted for about 34% of the total 
revenue of 100 Chinese accounting firms in 2011. With the continuous development and growth 
of China's securities market, the demand for high-quality audit services is still increasing. At 
the same time, the improved market-oriented economic system with Chinese characteristics has 
also set higher requirements and more challenges for auditors, the form of cooperation between 
Chinese and foreign firms before 2012 can no longer meet the new needs. Therefore, in May 
2012, China’s Ministry of Finance and other four major departments jointly issued the “Scheme 
for Localized Transformation of Sino-foreign Cooperative Accounting Firms” (hereinafter 
referred as the “Scheme”). The scheme required Big Four to reduce their differences with local 
accounting firms in order to promote legal compliance as well as weaken their competitive 
advantages in China. For example, partners of Big Four are required to hold Chinese certified 
public accountant (CPA). According to China Briefing (2012), the percentage of partners who 
hold the qualifications of CPA validated by foreign countries or regions is less than 40 percent 
of the total number of partners upon the issuance of the practicing certificate of the General 
Special Partnership Agreement, which is the joint venture license specifically issued to the 
MNC audit profession in China. This percentage is required to be reduced to no more than 20 
percent by 2017. The existing favorable terms about joint ventures will expire and Big Four had 
to make some necessary adjustments in order to renew their licenses, for instance, hire more 
local partners and employees. As a result, Big Four faced with the challenge of higher 
employees’ turnover.  
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It is possible to study how Big Four impacts the probability of privatization before and 
after the transformation by taking advantage of this exogenous policy shock happened in 2012. 
Define the companies that employed Big Four both before and after the 2012 policy 
implementation as the experiment group. The companies that were audited by local accounting 
firms both before and after the policy shock are the control groups. Since the scheme had great 
impacts on business activities of Big Four accounting firms, but almost no impacts on the local 
accounting firms’ operations, a quasi-natural experiment could be expected. Treat the state-
owned shares percentage of public listed SOEs as the explained variable, set control variables 
as the same as former specifications, and obtain the difference-in-differences estimators of the 
2012 policy effects using the following model: 
State Ownership it = α + β1 Scheme it + ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + Yt + Ri + it, Where: 
Schemeit is a dummy variable that equals 1 for every year after 2012 for every SOEs that hired 
one of the Big Four accounting firms, 0 otherwise; Yt is a year fixed effect; Ri is a regional fixed 
effect; it is the error term. 
This regression considered all the other firms in the sample as the control group. As the 
following results showed, the coefficient of scheme is 2.408, and it is significant at the 1% 
significance level, indicating that the difference between Big Four and other local firms was 
indeed weakened by the 2012 policy implementation. In addition, the policy implementation 
had positive effects on the share percentage owned by the state, and the impacts of Big Four on 
the privatization of state-owned enterprises declined since the gap between Big Four and local 






























Generally, auditing fees of the Big Four accounting firms are higher than local 
accounting firms since they can provide better audit services. The audit costs are related to 
decisions whether to hire one of the Big Four accounting firms or not. At the same time, audit 
fees usually depend on the auditing workload and the complexity of the company's business, so 
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it has no direct impacts on the decision whether to privatize the company or not. In this case, 
exogenous requirements are satisfied and audit costs could be used as an instrumental variable 
of the Big Four.  
In table 9, audit cost is treated as the instrumental variable. Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 
reported the results of the first stage regression. The estimated coefficient of audit cost is 
statistically significant, indicating that the audit cost is indeed positively correlated with the 
variable Big Four. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 reported the estimation results of the second stage 
regression. The coefficients of Big Four are all significantly negative at the 0.01 level, 
indicating that Big Four could help increase the probability of privatization and decrease the 
proportion of state-owned shares in Chinese SOEs. Therefore, after considering the potential 
endogenous problems caused by the relationship between Big Four and state control, the former 
results are still valid. 
Table 9: Two Stage Regression 






 Full Sample Full Sample State Owned Non-State Owned 

















Time F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 12439 12439 22096 22096 11251 11251 10845 10845 
 
Conclusion 
The paper used China's A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2018 as the sample to 
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conduct an empirical study on whether audit services can promote the privatization process of 
Chinese SOEs. The study found that after controlling the firm-level relevant factors, regional 
fixed effects, and time fixed effects, whether the listed SOEs employed Big Four as their 
auditors had a significant and positive impact on the privatization process. Specifically, hiring 
one of the Big Four accounting firms can improve the probability of privatization by about 16%, 
and decrease the proportion of state-owned shares in state-owned enterprises. In addition, when 
the company is audited by Big Four for one more year, the probability of ownership conversion 
increases by 2.24%, though such promotion effect was weakened after the localization of Big 
Four accounting firms in 2012. Furthermore, audit fee is treated as an instrumental variable of 
Big Four for two-stage regression analysis. After considering potential endogenous problems, 
same conclusions can still be reached. 
Previous studies have shown that the transfer of state-owned shares is often 
accompanied by serious information asymmetry problems. This paper believes that the 
management of state-owned enterprises has a strong motivation to deviate from profit 
maximization behaviors, so there is an incentive to avoid employing Big Four accounting firms 
for auditing services in order to reduce the information disclosure about their real financial 
performance. Generally, the auditing reports published by the Big Four are more reliable and 
accurate. Given that audit services can significantly improve the transparency of financial 
information in public listed companies, as well as monitor the behaviors of mangers and protect 
investors, thereby, Big Four can reduce the agency costs and information asymmetry faced by 
all parties in public during the privatization process and then promote the probability of 
privatization. In addition, the stakeholders in the market tend to have a much higher degree of 
recognition and trust on auditing reports issued by Big Four than those were published by local 
accounting firms. Therefore, SOEs that hired one of the Big Four accounting firms became 
more attractive to potential private investors and more likely to finish privatization successfully. 
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In 2012, the Scheme for Localized Transformation of Sino-foreign Cooperative 
Accounting Firms required the Big Four to localize further and reduce their differences with 
local accounting firms. So Big Four enjoyed less competitive advantages since then. However, 
the impact of such organizational restructure on Big Four is still limited since they still maintain 
better reputation arisen from their rich international auditing experience and best corporate 
governance practice. From the empirical evidence, Big Four still play a vital role in promoting 
the privatization process of state-owned enterprises in China. The imperfectness of domestic 
accounting and auditing systems is also an important factor that restrict local accounting firms 
to improve their auditing quality. Therefore, it is necessary to fully improve the domestic 
institutional environment, legal environment and investor protection environment, and further 
help local auditors to learn about advanced auditing standards in order to gradually close the 
gap between local accounting firms and the international Big Four. Currently, China is making 
great efforts to implement deeper reforms of state-owned enterprises, promoting the integration 
of state-owned and private capital is one of the most important directions. As an effective 
external regulatory agency and information transmitter for public listed companies, the 
accounting firms have obligations to play a more significant role in the privatization process, 
for example, improve audit quality, reduce the opacity of financial information, provide 
protection for sparse investors to help promote privatization of state-owned enterprises. 
In summary, the paper used empirical research methods to explore the impact of Big 
Four audits on the privatization process of state-owned enterprises and explained the 
mechanism of such impacts. However, the paper is limited by the acquisition of available data. 
For example, in the calculation of the state-owned shares percentage, a keyword search method 
is adopted to identify the shareholders of public listed companies, it is difficult to distinguish 
whether some institutional shareholders are state shareholders or not, causing potential 
deviations in the measurement of the variable state ownership, which requires further 
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investigation. Another limitation is the endogeneity problem, although instrument variable is 
used for Big Four to conduct a two-stage regression, there are no theoretical evidence from past 
literatures to support the rationality. Other control variables included in the regression such as 
ROA and leverage ratio are also impacted by government involvement in many studies. For 
example, Abolhassani, Wang & Hann (2019) have found that government’s direct and indirect 
control can influence the financial performance of public listed companies on the stock 
exchanges of Shanghai and Shenzhen. So potential endogeneity problem was not solved. 
Chinese SOEs have now entered a crucial stage of deep ownership reform, improving 
their efficiency and realizing the enlargement and strengthening of them are important to ensure 
the country's economic growth. Future researches can explore the role of effective external 
supervision in improving the operating efficiency of state-owned enterprises and study other 
potential factors that could have impacts on the privatization process to find more feasible 
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Table 1 Province Code in China 





15 Inner Mongolia 
21 Liaoning 
22 Jilin 
23 Heilongjiang 
31 Shanghai 
32 Jiangsu 
33 Zhejiang 
34 Anhui 
35 Fujian 
36 Jiangxi 
37 Shandong 
41 Henan 
42 Hubei 
43 Hunan 
44 Guangdong 
45 Guangxi 
46 Hainan 
50 Chongqing 
51 Sichuan 
52 Guizhou 
53 Yunnan 
54 Xizang 
61 Shaanxi 
62 Gansu 
63 Qinghai 
64 Ningxia 
65 Xinjiang 
 
